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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of wage comparisons among inequity averse
agents on optimal incentive intensities in a linear-exponential-normal moral haz-
ard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks
that dier in that only individual production causes wage inequality. If the tasks
are substitutes in the agents' eort cost functions, the principal might want to
balance incentives and reduce the agents' overall inequality exposure. We show
that team production incentives can then be muted below the level that results
from noisy measurement and risk aversion alone|even though team production
does not cause wage inequality.
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1 Introduction
Much progress has been made in understanding optimal incentives in moral hazard
models when agents have social preferences.1 The existing models consider environ-
ments where agents only conduct a single task. Often, however, principals must provide
incentives for multiple tasks simultaneously. It is thus important to understand how
social preferences aect optimal contracting in multi-tasking environments.
We analyze the impact of inequity aversion among agents (Fehr and Schmidt 1999)
in a moral hazard model with multiple agents and multi-tasking (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1991). The existing multi-tasking literature analyzes the impact of dierential
measurement precision on optimal incentives. We focus on tasks, such as individual
and team production, that dier in the extent of wage inequality that results from
incentivizing the tasks. While the measurement precision of individual and team pro-
duction should not dier systematically, a systematic dierence with respect to wage
inequality results when wages depend on measured output. A team output measure
applies to all agents, but an individually produced output measure only applies to
the respective agent. Hence, if the agents receive identical incentive contracts, wage
inequality can result in individual production, but not in team production.
The highlighted dierence between the two classes of tasks is, as such, irrelevant
with purely self-interested agents. We show with inequity averse agents, in contrast,
that dierences in expected wage inequality can have eects on optimal incentive con-
tracts comparable to those of dierential measurement precision. Our approach in this
paper is to document these eects in a model frame that places priority on yielding
simple and clear closed form solutions, rather than in one that maximizes generality.
2 Model
Consider a principal and two identical agents i, i 2 f1; 2g, who devote eort ai to
individual production tasks, measured by output qi = ai+"i, and to a team production
task, measured by output qt = bi+bj+"t, where bi and bj denote agent i's and j's eort
devoted to team production, respectively. Error terms "i and "t are independent and
1See, e.g., Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2008), and Neilson and Stowe (2010).
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drawn from normal distributions with mean zero. Importantly, with team production
the same error term applies to both agents, because only joint output is measured.
Chance variations thus cannot cause any inequality in measured team output. Since
we are not interested in dierences in measurement precision, we set the variance of
both the individual and the team error term to 2 > 0.
The risk neutral principal maximizes expected prot, which is the sum of individual
outputs and team output less wage payments. The agents have a constant absolute
risk aversion utility function,  expf (wi    (ai; bi)   Li)g, where  > 0 is the risk
aversion coecient, wi agent i's wage,  (ai; bi) the quadratic eort cost function, and
Li agent i's expected loss from wage inequality, which is explained below.
Eort is non-contractible but agents can be remunerated as a function of individual
and team output. We analyze symmetric, linear contracts, wi = r+vqi+uqj+vtqt, with
i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, where r denotes a xed payment, v and vt are, respectively, the
individual and team compensation coecients, and u is the coecient of the respective
other agent's individual output.
We assume that agents incur utility losses if their wages dier from each other and
that the size but not the sign of the dierence matters.2 In particular, we assume that
agent i cares about the expected loss from wage inequality, which, given u  v,3 is
Li = (v   u)
  Z 1
ai aj
(z   ai + aj)f(z)dz +
Z ai aj
 1
(ai   aj   z)f(z)dz

; (1)
where z  "j   "i and f(z) is the p.d.f. of z, which is z  N(0; 2z) with 2z = 22.
The agents' sensitivity to inequality is denoted by   0. The expected loss is taken
ex-ante and independently from the expectation over wage levels, which implies risk
neutrality with respect to wage inequality but risk aversion with respect to wage levels.
The principal maximizes expected gross prot minus expected wage payments by
choice of r, v, vt, and u. He must ensure the agents' participation and take into account
2In the notation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we assume  = . See Bartling (2011) for a single-
tasking version of the same model frame that allows for    and also for eort cost comparisons.
3It cannot be optimal to set u > v. To minimize risk exposure, u must be set to zero, while u = v
minimizes inequality exposure. Further increasing u thus cannot be optimal.
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that, given the contracts, the agents maximize their utility functions by choice of eort.
By standard results, the principal's program can be written as
max
v;vt;u
ai + b

i    (ai ; bi )  0:5(v2 + v2t + u2)2   Li(ai ; aj ; v; u) (2)
subject to the incentive constraints for individual and team production
v =  ai and vt =  bi (3)
respectively. Subscripts to the cost function indicate partial derivatives. Coecient r
must be nally set to ensure the agents' participation. We derive the symmetric equi-
librium ai = a

j . At ai = aj, as a consequence of symmetric inequity aversion, agents
cannot aect expected wage inequality neither by marginally working harder nor by
slacking o, i.e., @Li=@ai jai=aj= 0. Hence, as with purely self-interested agents, incen-
tive constraints are given by (3). To ensure the agents' participation, however, agents
must be compensated not only for eort costs and risk exposure but also for their
expected loss from wage inequality in equilibrium. With symmetric eort choices, the
equilibrium loss depends only on the relative size of the individual error terms and (1)
can be written as
Li(v; u j ai = aj) = 2(v   u)=
p
: (4)
For the derivation see Appendix A1. The loss increases in the degree  of inequity
aversion and in the measurement error , because with higher variance more probability
mass is on larger wage dierences. The smaller the dierence v   u of the individual
compensation coecients, the smaller the expected loss; it is zero if u = v.
3 Contracts
We rst determine the coecient u linking an agent's wage to the respective other
agent's individual output. Maximization of (2) with respect to u yields
u = min

2

p

; v

: (5)
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For the derivation see Appendix A2. To minimize risk, an agent's wage should be inde-
pendent of the respective other agent's individual outcome, i.e., u = 0. To minimize
expected inequality, however, u = v is optimal. Equation (5) shows the solution to
the risk-inequality trade-o.
We can now derive the optimal incentive intensity. With multi-tasking, it is crucial
how the agents' tasks interact in the eort cost functions. To highlight the point of
this paper|dierences in expected wage inequality have eects on optimal incentives
similar to dierences in measurement precision|we consider the case of perfect sub-
stitutes, i.e.,  (a; b) =  (a+ b). Only the sum of a+ b can then be determined, and all
cross-partial derivatives of the agents' cost function are identical. For notational con-
venience, we dene a+b = c. If the principal wants the agents to engage in both tasks,
incentive intensities cannot reect dierences in measurement precision nor dierences
in inequality exposure. The principal faces the single incentive constraint v = vt =  c.
Maximization of (2) with respect to the incentive intensity then yields
v = vt = max

1  2  cc=
p

1 + 22 cc
;
1
1 + 32 cc

: (6)
For the derivation see Appendix A3. The left entry in the brackets shows the optimal
solution in case u < v, the right entry in case u = v. We summarize this nding in
the following.
Proposition. With inequity averse agents, if the principal wants the agents to engage
in both individual and team production, the incentive intensity for the team task can be
muted below the level that results from noisy measurement and risk aversion alone in
order to reduce expected wage inequality, even though team production never generates
wage inequality.
The proof follows directly from the comparison of vt in (6) with the solution of
the case with purely self-interested agents and perfect substitutability of eort, that is
given by the left entry in (6) with  = 0.
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4 Conclusions
Our paper complements Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1991) well known nding that
a muted incentive intensity for an easily measured task can be optimal, because an
important competing task is dicult to measure. Homstrom and Milgrom explain the
\puzzle [...] that employment contracts so often specify xed wages and generally that
incentives in rms appear to be so muted" (p. 24). Muted incentives appear puzzling,
because often some tasks are easy to measure and thus appear well suited for high
incentivization. We show that the multi-tasking framework can, in addition, explain
muted incentives for an easily measured task not because a competing task is dicult
to measure, but because a competing task generates wage inequality.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Expected Loss from Wage Inequality in Equation (4)
Equation (4) is derived by integration of the expression in (1), given ai = aj.
Li = (v   u)
Z 1
0
zf(z)dz +
Z 0
 1
 zf(z)dz

= 2(v   u)
Z 1
0
zf(z)dz = 2(v   u) 1p
2z
Z 1
0
z e
  z2
22z dz
= lim
y!1
2(v   u) 1p
2z

 2z e 
z2
22z
y
0
= 2(v   u) zp
2
= 2(v   u) p

(A1)
A.2 Derivation of u in Equation (5)
The principal maximizes (2) with respect to u, where Li(ai; aj; v; u) is given by (4).
The rst-order condition is then given by
(1   ai )
@ai
@u
  u2 + 2p

= 0 (A2)
Since @ai =@u = 0, rearranging yields the left entry in (5).
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A.3 Derivation of v in Equation (6)
With v = vt =  c, maximization of (2) with respect to v requires in case u
 < v
 
1   ci
@ci
@v
  22v   2=p = 0 (A3)
and in case u = v
 
1   ci
@ci
@v
  32v = 0 (A4)
Substituting the rst-order condition v =  ci and using @c

i =@v = 1= cc, we get (6).
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